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or design of God in and through us, is that this marvellous means should result in *real* thought, in thought expressed in loving act, which it is competent to do at once and in all. God will not recognize Himself in our floating Universes, our "systems of thought," our philosophies—all these He regards kindly, perhaps, though smilingly, as enlargement of our means, if indeed they are capable of inspiring one good deed—but it is in Goodness alone that the Divine sees itself fully expressed; that is what makes of Man God's Providence here, and seals him with the immortal promise. For a loving deed—that is verily, and alone, a Divine thought, concrete, complete, expressed—an Act.

PROFESSOR CAIRD ON KANT.

BY J. HUTCHISON STIRLING.

Before proceeding to the second of my objections in allusion, it would throw light, and assist understanding, did I refer to Mr. Caird's views on this, the most important question in the entire Criticism of Kant; for to mistake causality is to mistake the system.¹

It will be obvious to every one whose opinion is relevant, that Mr. Caird's views on causality must be sought where Mr. Caird treats causality, and that it is only wilfully vexatious to get up a hue and cry against what a man truly finds there, or, with an air of indignation, point to an elsewhere that exists not, or is inapplicable, or that is simply hoped to be taken on trust. To every one so qualified, it will also be equally obvious that what a man finds there, and truly finds

¹ In reference to this "allusion," I have to explain that Mr. Caird's reply, in this JOURNAL, to certain remarks of mine in my Kant-Schopenhauer article, found me busy with preparation of a continuation to that article. Into this continuation I saw it would be advantageous to it, if permissible for me, to introduce what might be said in rejoinder to Mr. Caird. Accordingly, I occupied myself for some time in this direction. The result, however, was a paper so long that I have been obliged to divide it. The half now given (which regards Mr. Caird), had it been alone concerned, might have appeared three months ago. Why it should precede the other half—publication being once determined upon—will be understood without difficulty.

to record here, then. Mr. Caird had expressly to do in Schopenhauer with what I had to do, and both by silence and by speech — however extraordinary that was, however damning that was — he gave it the most significant support. In very fulness of his heart, indeed, viewing Schopenhauer's assistance in the composition of his work, Mr. Caird, when that work is accomplished, cannot help tendering express thanks to Schopenhauer as one to whom he "owes most." And what *did* Mr. Caird owe to Schopenhauer? What *could* Mr. Caird owe to Schopenhauer — what but these same extraordinary deliverances on causality? That reference — the reference to Schopenhauer on causality — is express, and full, and at large. There is only one allusion to Schopenhauer elsewhere in Mr. Caird's whole book, and it is a trifle about weight, which is rejected by Mr. Caird himself, and dispatched in a clause. The conclusion is inevitable, then, that the contributions for which Mr. Caird so expressly thanks Schopenhauer concerned causality alone. Perhaps it was they, indeed, that suggested to Mr. Caird that original step *beyond* Schopenhauer. All the more curious it is, then, that he should not have remembered this; the rather, too, that it was the only thing he was, so to speak, *asked* to remember. But let us come, now, to the two allegations.

Mr. Caird complains that he is accused of "asserting, and asserting as the doctrine of Kant, that objects are known as objects through the category of causality alone;" and his reply is: This "assertion has never been made by me; it is inconsistent with many express statements of my book; and I should never have supposed that any one could ascribe it to me, had not Dr. Stirling actually done so." To this, discounting all that we know about such words not being mine, my rejoinder is that *I homologate the accusation*. Mr. Caird's language, as discussed in my Schopenhauer article, directly contained the assertion; and what he brings forward now, whether by quotation or by reference, as proof of the contrary doctrine, contains no such proof.

Had a contrary doctrine really existed elsewhere in Mr. Caird's book, it would have been no misrepresentation on my part only truly to represent what was then and there before me; and that I did. The *expression* of an opposite doctrine may exist in Mr. Caird's book; but it seems even yet to be beyond Mr. Caird's consciousness. Mr. Caird does not succeed, in his reply, to refer to a single true case of it; and that such *expression* should occur, or even *must* occur, we have at once the explanation and the guarantee in the fact that Kant's own language must at times not only be directly referred to, but actually

quoted. The existence, in fact, of any number of contrary doctrines in Mr. Caird's book would be no surprise to me—in view, that is, of his own equipment for the work, and the principles on which it appears to have been conducted. It is said of Schelling, in reference to his successive publications of varying systems (to call them so), that he carried on his studies “before the public;” and, perhaps, something similar may be relevantly said of Mr. Caird and the successive chapters of his Kant. Mr. Caird, namely, does not seem, if we may be allowed to judge from what we see, to have first articulated Kant to his own self, and *then* to have re-articulated him for the public. On the contrary, one would figure him to have studied Kant simply from chapter to chapter, and to have written down his results just as they came to hand, without referring them the one to the other, and all together to any correlating ground-plan of the whole—a ground-plan which he had previously been at the pains to put together for himself. But, such considerations apart, what alone occupied me (in my former article) was Mr. Caird on “Schopenhauer's objection to the deduction of causality,” at pp. 456–460. The reader can examine these for himself, and draw his own conclusions. I, for my part, assert them unequivocally to contain the doctrine with which I charged Mr. Caird, even as by him strained; and what satisfies me in proof, are considerations both of silence and of speech. To call Kant's *house* subjective was a monstrous error on the part of Schopenhauer; but to hold Kant to regard his category of causality as alone the agent of objectivity in perception, was an error infinitely more monstrous—an error that struck at the foundation of the whole building—an error that summarily sisted any pretending expositor's entire case—an error that was simply ruin at once both to principal and accessory. Now, both errors being *the* matters—wholly and solely *the* matters—expressly and directly viewed, it never once struck Mr. Caird—even in passing—to call *Schopenhauer wrong!* On the contrary, like Schopenhauer, he directly calls the *house* subjective; and, like Schopenhauer, he *unequivocally* expresses himself as implying the conviction that causality is alone, of all Kant's categories, the objectifying minister. Surely that silence, in such a case, is not less significant than this speech! But what does it imply that Mr. Caird finds himself obliged, with Schopenhauer, to regard the *house*, as in spite of Kant, objective—obliged, therefore, further, and still with Schopenhauer, to *make* the house objective, and *show* it objective? Schopenhauer, as there is, to his belief, but one category of objectivity to Kant, thinks himself under a necessity, for the due effecting of the operation and the proof required, to have recourse to

of objects and events in time, and see objects and events in time, without connecting them the one with the other at all. And that at once negates Mr. Caird's next step, the "dating" of objects in time, the identification of each object with its own moment in time, so that objects must succeed each other in the same irreversible succession in which time itself flows on. I have already shown (in first, unpublished, part of this essay) that, *let Kant's words seem what they may*, there is no such doctrine as this in Kant. Mr. Caird holds it to be impossible for objects or events "to be represented as in time at all, unless their manifold is combined in a synthesis which has an irreversible order." It is true that no succession can be represented in time as an *event*, unless its manifold is *of itself* in necessary order; but any succession, reversible or irreversible, or otherwise as it may, can, simply as it stands there, be represented in time. Was Kant's house incapable of being represented in time, then; and what of series that are reciprocal, A B C D's that are quite as much D C B A's? However it might be with time, it was quite evident to Kant that things themselves were not always in the same kind of succession in time. To Mr. Caird, however, it seems that "objects" "cannot be represented as in time at all, unless their manifold is combined in a synthesis which has an irreversible order!" — "the denial of causality necessarily involves the denial of all succession in time!"

"So soon as we 'bring to conceptions' (p. 77; Tr., p. 63), or, in other words, to clear consciousness, the synthesis by which two events are determined in time in relation to each other, we see that it contains or involves the category of causality." In one way, that is saying nothing, for as much lies in the very word *event*; so soon as we see event, we see causality. But what is meant must be, that to "bring to conceptions," or, what is the same thing, "clear consciousness," *any* synthesis, is to see that it involves causality. That is proved by the words *from* which the above sentence follows with a "for." "We cannot, like Hume, set succession against causality, for so soon," etc. That plainly means that succession is equivalent to causality, and that we see this the moment we "bring it to conceptions," or, what is the same thing, to "clear consciousness."

Suppose now, here, we turn up Mr. Caird's reference. In Kant (I have not the translation) it runs thus: "To bring this synthesis to notions, that is a function which pertains to the understanding, and whereby it first procures us cognition (perception) in proper signification." Now what is this synthesis? It is the "synthesis of the imagination," which, as we have seen, and may further see in a

objects have always attended them, and have existed in a regular order of contiguity and succession with regard to them. Thus, we remember to have seen that species of object which we call *flame*, and to have felt that species of sensation we call *heat*. We likewise call to mind their constant conjunction in all past instances. Without any further ceremony we call the one cause, and the other effect, and infer the existence of the one from the other."¹ The experience from which Hume here starts, and by means of which he explains away causality, is not simply a series of sensations following each other in a certain order, but it is an experience in which each sensation, as it came, has been referred to an object which is recognized as again present to us as the same object, or an object of the same kind, on the recurrence of a similar sensation. But sensations, thus interpreted, are not mere sensations. They are sensations viewed as reporting of permanent objects, which are regarded as the same, just because they stand in permanent relations to other objects; and would not be recognized as the same, if their relations were regarded as different. At any change in such objects, we are obliged to find the cause in an alteration of the conditions; and if we did not so find it, we could not recognize them as the same, or even as objects at all. To suppose that there could be presented to us in sense, a succession of phenomena, which cannot be thus referred to a permanent identity, or a permanent identity, which does not manifest itself in the same way when other conditions are the same, would be to suppose an experience in complete discord with the conditions under which experience is possible. Such a series of sensations or perceptions, Kant does not conceive as impossible in itself, but what he says in regard to it is, that, if it occurred, we should never be able to bring it into the context of experience. A miracle, in the sense of such an abolition of the law of causality, may be, for aught we know, possible; but it is an *impossible experience*.

This substantially is the argument of Kant in the Deduction of causality. He successively insists on all these points, on the necessary combination of causality and substance, of the ideas of permanence and change, and the correspondence of each of these with the two sides of the conception of time, as a unity, and as a series of moments. At the beginning of the argument, however, he introduces a confusing complication, when he *asks* why it is that we treat the parts of a house, which we see successively, as not being really or objectively successive, while we treat the successive positions of a ship

¹ Treatise on Human Nature, Part III., sect. 6. Cf. Green's Hume, Vol. I., p. 268, sect. 812.

would be forever unknowable, wrapped in itself, if, as subjectivity, it did not transform itself into objectivity—finite, phenomenal nature being the symbol of this transformation. Philosophy, as a whole, is therefore absolute idealism, since that act (subject become object) is included in the divine knowing, and the philosophy of nature offers no antithesis in the first, only in the relative ideality, which is but one side of the absolute ideal. For the complete reflection of its essentiality into particularity, to the identity of both, produces in God the ideas; so that the unity of that through which they are in themselves, and real, with that through which they are in the absolute, and ideal, is one and the same. But in particular things, which are the mere copies of ideas, these unities do not appear as one; in nature, as the merely relative-real side, the first preponderates, so that it appears in contrast with the other where the unveiled, undisguised ideal shines forth as the negative, while the former, on the contrary, is its positive, and manifests itself as its principle—both being but the relative modes of manifestation of the one absolute ideal, in which they are united as one. According to this view, nature is one, not only in its essence, where it is the whole absolute act of subject become object, but also on its phenomenal side, where it manifests itself as the relative-real, or objective side of that act. Nature in its very essence is one; there is no inner antithesis in her; there is one life in all things, and one power to be, the same regulative principle through ideas. There is no pure materiality in nature, but there is everywhere soul symbolically represented in body, with a preponderance of one or the other in phenomena. For the same reason there can be but one science of nature, and the parts into which it is divided by the understanding are but branches of the same absolute knowing.

A priori deduction (construction) is representation of the real in the ideal, of the particular in the pure general in the idea. Every particular, as such, is form; but the necessary eternal, and absolute form of all forms is the source and origin. The act of making the subject objective ("*subject-objectivation*") goes through all things and generates special forms,

a mere play of that representation. Phantasy—that is, creative power of imagination—must not mingle with it, for that would make memory untrue. To *take hold* in memory of something quickly, readily to *recall* it, and to *retain* it for a long time—these are formal perfections of memory. But these qualities are rarely met together. When a person believes that he has something in his memory, but cannot recall it to consciousness, he says that he cannot call it to mind. The endeavor to do so, if nevertheless attempted, is a very great exertion of the brain; and the best method is to let other thoughts busy one's self for a while, looking only casually back upon the object, in which case one will generally seize hold of one of the associate representations that recalls the primitive one.

To take hold of something in memory methodically (*memoriæ mandare*) is called to *memorize* (not to *study*, as the vulgar are apt to say of the preacher, who merely learns his sermon by heart). This memorizing may be *mechanical*, or *ingenious*, or *judicious*. The first is based merely on repeated literal repetition; for instance, in the learning of the multiplication-table, in which instance the student often has to go through the whole series of the words that follow each other in their usual succession in order to arrive at the figure sought for. Thus, when the pupil is asked, How much is 3 times 7? he will begin at 3 times 3, and arriving at 3 times 7, will also probably catch the 21; but when you ask him, How much is 7 times 3? he will not be so quick in arriving at the solution, but will have to reverse the numbers in order to get the answer. If it is a solemn formula which has to be learned, in which no expression must be changed, but which has to be learned by heart, as it is called, it happens that men, even of the best kind of memory, are afraid to trust themselves (which very fear is likely to lead them astray), and therefore consider it necessary to read it off aloud. Indeed, the most practical preachers are apt to do so, since the least change of words might make them appear ridiculous.

Ingenious memorizing consists in a method of impressing

to have brought together so much raw material, even if it needs other minds to work it up judiciously (*tantum scimus quantum memoria tenemus*). One of the ancients has said "the art of writing has ruined memory," by making it partly superfluous. There is something true in this proposition; for an ordinary man generally has the manifold which he has encountered better arranged on his mental thread, and can therefore recall it easier, because his memory is here mechanical, and admits no reasoning to intermingle, whilst the scholar, whose mind is occupied with many foreign thoughts, forgets many of his agreements, or homely occupations, through mere mental dissipation, because he did not take hold of them with sufficient attention. But to have your tablets safely in your pocket, to be quite sure that you can find surely and without difficulty what you have just put into your mind, is, at any rate, a very great comfort; and the art of writing is, after all, a very glorious art, which, although it is not used for the purpose of communicating knowledge to others, can yet represent the truest and most extensive memory, the lack of which it can replace.

Forgetfulness (*obliviositas*), on the contrary — in which case the mind, however often filled, remains nevertheless always empty, just like a sieve — is proportionately a greater evil. This evil is sometimes brought about without any fault of our own, as in the case of old men, who may well be able to remember the events of their early life, but always forget that which is nearest to their remembrance. Nevertheless this is often the effect of an habitual mental dissipation, which is apt to affect specially lady novel-readers. For since the only object of that kind of reading is to be entertained for the moment, every one knowing that it is mere fiction, and the reader having therefore full liberty to follow the bend of his or her own imagination while reading, which naturally dissipates the mind and makes *absence of mind* (lack of attention to the present) habitual — memory must inevitably be weakened. This exercise in the art of killing time and making one's self useless for the world, and yet complaining afterwards of the

we cannot lift ourselves on our feet, or that we have lost ourselves, or stopped in the middle of a sermon, or through forgetfulness put on a nightcap instead of a wig on entering a large assembly, or that we can fly in the air like a bird, or burst out in joyful laughter without knowing why. But it will probably remain a mystery forever, how it happens that in our dreams we are often transported back to long vanished times, and speak with people long since dead; and that, although we are tempted to look upon the whole occurrence as a dream, we nevertheless feel ourselves compelled to consider the dream an actuality. But we may probably accept it as certain that there can be no sleep without dreaming, and that a person who thinks he has not dreamed, has only forgotten his dream.

Concerning the Designatory Faculty (Faculty Signatrix).

§ 36. The faculty of cognizing the present, as a means of connecting the representation of the foreseen with that of the past, is called the designatory faculty. The act of the mind in effecting this connection is the affixing of a sign (*signatio*), also called signalizing, and the higher degree whereof is named distinction.

Forms of things, so far as they serve only as a means of obtaining representations through conceptions, are symbols, and cognition by means thereof is called symbolic or figurative (*speciosa*). Letters or hieroglyphics are not exactly symbols; for they may also be merely mediate, indirect signs, signifying nothing in themselves, but leading to contemplations, and thereby to conceptions, only by means of association. Hence symbolical cognition must be opposed not to intuitive, but to discursive cognition, in which latter the sign (*character*) accompanies the conception only as a custodian (*custos*), for the purpose of reproducing it at some future time. Hence symbolical cognition is opposed, as said before, not to intuitive cognition, which arises from sensuous contemplation, but to intellectual cognition, which arises from conceptions. Symbols are mere means of the understanding, and this they are

§ 37. We may divide signs into *arbitrary* (artificial), *natural*, and *miraculous* signs.

A. Amongst the first-named class of signs are: 1. *Gestures* (mimics also, since they are partly natural). 2. *Letters* (signs for speech). 3. *Notes* (signs for tones). 4. *Ciphers* (signs agreed upon between certain persons, and only for the use of the eye). 5. *Crest* (signs of hereditary rank). 6. *Uniform and livery* (signs of service). 7. *Orders* (signs of honor and merit). 8. *Brands* (signs of disgrace). We must also count in the signs of pauses, interrogations, exclamations, etc., used in writing.

All language is the expression of thoughts by signs, and, *vice versa*, the best mode of expressing thoughts by signs is that afforded by language — this greatest means of all to understand one's self and make one's self understood by others. To think is to speak with one's self (the Otaheite Indians call thinking speech in the belly), and hence also, to hear one's self inwardly (through the reproductive power of imagination). To the deaf and dumb, his speech is a feeling of the movement of his lips, tongue and jaw; and it is scarcely possible to imagine that, in speaking, he does anything else than to carry on a play with his bodily feelings, he having really no conceptions or thoughts. But even persons who can speak and hear do not always understand themselves or others; and it is mainly due to a deficiency in the faculty of designation, or to a faulty use thereof (people taking signs for things, or *vice versa*), that men are often so far apart in their notions (especially in matters appertaining to reason) though they are agreed in their speech. This is made apparent only by accident, namely, when each one acts on his own notions.

B. So far as the natural signs are concerned, the relation of the signs to the designated things is, in regard to time, either demonstrative, or recollective, or prognostic.

The beat of our pulse makes known to the doctor the present feverish condition of the patient, even as smoke indicates a fire. The *reagents* discover to the chemist the matters concealed in water, even as the weathercock shows the direction of the wind. But whether a *blush* betrays consciousness of guilt,

some measures, at once made an attempt to become duke of Florence. The way which he took to accomplish this end brought the city into the most dangerous situation, although it brought him power.

At this time Venice was the most powerful State in Italy, perhaps in Europe. The Venetians held the same position which to-day the English hold. In opposition to them, Lorenzo de Medici, the duke of Milan, and the king of Naples formed a league, and these three States together against the fourth, strongest of all, held the balance of power in Italy. As soon as Lorenzo died, hostilities broke out between Milan and Naples. Piero de Medici took the side of the king, while the duke of Milan allied himself to France, and invited to Italy Charles VIII., a young, ambitious prince, whose house formerly laid claim to Naples.

Charles made every effort to gain Piero de Medici to his side, but Piero acted shamefully. The people, ever since their early history, had been inclined towards the French; but Piero did not wish to break with Naples, and refused Charles's proposal. Then the king of France entered Tuscany as an enemy, and was everywhere victorious. Finally Piero changed his policy, and threw himself at the feet of the French. Without being conquered, he evacuated the fortresses, and hoped by this extreme humiliation to gain from Charles that favor which would now be useless to him if shown by Naples. But his reckoning was false. His behavior embittered the people; the nobility rebelled, Piero was forced to flee, Charles recognized the republic in its new form, and the attempts of the Medici to be again reinstated in power were fruitless. Michael Angelo, at that time twenty years of age, had left the city before the catastrophe, having been warned, Condivi says, by threatening dreams. He soon returned, however, and was an ardent defender of the new order of things.

At the same time with the political revolution, another one began in behalf of morality and religion, guided by Savonarola, a monk born in Ferrara, who, as prior of the cloister of San Marco, had within a few years grown very powerful and influential, and now was the soul of the ruling party.

nephew, Florence was under the control of the Medici, until in 1527 it rebelled for the last time. Michael Angelo was at that time over fifty years of age.

I called him a friend of the family. Strictly speaking, however, the old Lorenzo was the only one whom he knew well. When Piero succeeded, he left the palace in which he had been living; and when Piero was driven off, he stood upon good terms with a distant branch of the family, who, had been banished, and now returned to the city. Afterward Michael Angelo's friend and patron was Soderini, who, until 1512, ruled the city as Gonfalonier for life, and who was especially opposed to the Medici. During the papacy of Leo X. he stayed very little in Rome, and made nothing of importance for him; but when Clement VII. employed him, since he was the greatest artist of his time, it was true that the commissions which he received were less honor to him than his acceptance of them was to those who gave them. He was a free man, and chose the side on which he would fight, without being bound either way.

In the year 1527, as in 1494, the aristocrats, by whom the revolution was begun, wished to hold the reins alone and as before, they were again overpowered by the whole body of citizens. There were at that time a great many men who had seen and heard Savonarola. They insisted that it should be then as before,—the former strict moral codes should be renewed, processions instituted, the old form of government, the consilio, restored. Michael Angelo was one of the members of the state commission on military affairs. He at once urged the fortification of the city. Capponi, the first of the three Gonfalonieri who had guided the helm during the first three years of the republic, opposed it. There was no danger at hand, and the fortification would be a dangerous demonstration. Capponi belonged to the aristocrats, but he wished to rule so that he should suit all parties. This was the very thing that had caused Soderini's failure. Capponi was a follower of Savonarola in reference to the freedom of the city and the consilio, but he wished no alliance with France; while this alliance formed the chief article of creed with the party

effects are fearful, but not criminal. But here shameful treason appeared, whose invisible nets were drawn around the victim more and more closely, till at last, powerless, it was delivered into the hands of the enemy. Treason had become so common at that time that it is mentioned by Macchiavelli, without comment, as one of the customary state expedients, and that whenever it was practised the principle was never questioned. One pitied the victim, but the way and manner of the fall was not considered any thing extraordinary. Malatesta Baglioni's method of working is therefore no terrible exception, for which no one was prepared; on the contrary, his treacherous course was from the beginning thought of and considered possible. The act in this case was fearful only on account of the tragic scene which it caused.

Baglioni laid claim to Perugia. When, in the name of the king of France, he was employed as the first general for Florence, and undertook to carry on the war with his troops, the pope was so badly off that the whole affair seemed to Baglioni very advantageous in reference to his position in Perugia. But when, after the reconciliation between pope and emperor, other relations were entered into, Baglioni would have lost with the fall of Florence his city, his troops, — in short, everything that he possessed. It behooved him to guard his own interest in case of a fall, which was possible, and very soon seen to be inevitable.

The pope met his endeavors half-way. Clement was in quite as critical a condition as his opponent. Not only was he obliged to pay with his own money the imperial troops now before Florence, but he had made additional agreements with the Prince of Orange, who commanded them; he had promised him the hand of the young Catherine de Medici, who was then held prisoner by the rebels in Florence. When he did that, he knew very well that Orange intended to take Florence as a principedom for himself. It never entered the mind of a Medici to resign this city. He thought of ways and means to let the city be besieged by Orange, without allowing it to come into his power. It is now evident that Clement had an understanding with Baglioni that he should defend Florence

He loved Dante. He knew by heart whole poems of his. Even in the time of Pope Leo, the Florentines wished to have within their walls the ashes of the great exile. They appealed to the pope, and Michael Angelo's name is found under the petition. "I, Michael Angelo, the sculptor, also petition your Holiness, and I pledge myself to execute a monument worthy of the divine poet, and to put it in the city in a place honorable to him." Nothing came of all of this, because in Ravenna it was said that the ashes of Dante could not be found. Now, like Dante, he was himself an exile who wandered in a strange land. He seemed to compare his own situation with that of the great poet, and to console himself with the similarity of their fate.

Michael Angelo had been a few days in Venice when he repented of the step he had taken. He determined to return. Florence, which he had considered the prey of its enemies, had from the pitiful confusion in which he left it been roused to heroic energy. The citizens had solemnly sworn to conquer or to die. No more treaty or compromise. A heart-rending document has been preserved to us, which represented the feeling of the people; that is a dispatch of the Venetian ambassador in Florence, which was sent to Venice shortly after Michael Angelo's flight. It is quite probable that it was shown to him there. Every word must have fallen on his heart like a burning tear. His only desire then was to be again in Florence, and take part in the glory of his fatherland.

"How shall we speak of him, for our blind eyes
Are all unequal to his dazzling rays?
Easier it is to blame his enemies
Than for the tongue to tell his lightest praise.
For us did he explore the realms of woe;
And at his coming did high heaven expand
Her lofty gates, to whom his native land
Refused to open hers. Yet shalt thou know,
Ungrateful city, in thine own despite,
That thou hast fostered best thy Dante's fame;
For virtue, when oppressed, appears more bright,
And brighter therefore shall his glory be.
Suffering, of all mankind, most wrongfully;
Since in the world there lives no greater name."

The idea that the body may be preserved in a healthy state longer by sparing it — *i.e.*, by inactivity — is an error which springs from a false and mechanical conception of life. It is just as foolish to imagine that health depends on the abundance and excellence of food, for without the power of assimilating the food taken, nourishment of whatever kind does more harm than good ; all real strength develops from activity alone.

§ 56. Physical education, according as it relates to the repairing, the muscular, or the emotional activities, is divided into (1) diatetics, (2) gymnastics, (3) sexual education. In the direct activity of life these all interact with each other, but for our purposes we are obliged to speak of them as if they worked independently. Moreover, in the development of the human being, they come into maturity of development in a certain order: nutrition, muscular growth, sexual maturity. But Pedagogics can treat of these only as they are found in the infant, the child, and the youth ; for with the arrival of mature life, education is over.

FIRST CHAPTER.

Diatetics.

§ 57. By diatetics we mean the art of repairing the constant waste of the system, and, in childhood, of also building it up to its full form and size. Since in reality each organism has its own way of doing this, the diatetical practice must vary somewhat with sex, age, temperament, occupation, and circumstances. The science of Pedagogics has then, in this department, only to enunciate general principles. If we go into details, we fall into triviality. Nothing can be of more importance for the whole life than the way in which the physical education is managed in the very first stages of development. So generally is this fact accepted, that almost every nation has its own distinct system, which has been carefully elaborated. Many of these systems, no doubt, are characterized by gross errors, and widely differ as to time, place, and character, and yet they all have a justification for their peculiar form.

make too rich, and accompany with coffee, tea, etc. The clothing should be not only suitable in shape and size, it must also be made of simple and inexpensive material, so that the child may not be hampered in his play by the constant anxiety that a spot or a rent may cause fault to be found with him. If we foster in the child's mind too much thought about his clothes, we tend to produce either a narrow-mindedness, which treats affairs of the moment with too much respect and concerns itself with little things, or an empty vanity. Vanity is often produced by dressing children in a manner that attracts attention. (No one can fail to remark the peculiar healthful gayety of German children, and to contrast it with the different appearance of American children. It is undoubtedly true that the climate has much to do with this result, but it is also true that we may learn much from that nation in our way of treating children. Already we import their children's story-books, to the infinite delight of the little ones, and copies of their children's pictures are appropriated constantly by our children's magazines and picture-books. It is to be greatly desired that we should adopt the very sensible custom which prevails in Germany, of giving to each child its own little bed to sleep in, no matter how many may be required ; and, in general, we shall not go far astray if we follow the Germans in their treatment of their happy children.)

§ 64. Cleanliness is a virtue to which children should be trained, not only for the sake of their physical health, but also because it has a decided moral influence. Cleanliness will not have things deprived of their distinctive and individual character, and become again a part of original chaos. It is only a form of order which remands all things, dirt included, to their own places, and will not endure to have things mixed and confused. All adaptation in dress comes from this same principle. When every thing is in its proper place, all dressing will be suitable to the occasion and to the wearer, and the era of good taste in dress will have come. Dirt itself, as Lord Palmerston so wittily said, is nothing but "matter out of place." Cleanliness would hold every individual thing strictly to its differences from other things, and for the reason that it

This is an external means. But he should never forget that every influence which he can bring to bear in his daily work to make science pleasant and attractive, and every lesson which he gives in the use of pure, correct English, free from exaggeration, from slang, and from mannerism, goes far to render such miserable and pernicious trash distasteful even to the child himself.

Every example of thorough work, every pleasure that comes from the solving of a problem or the acquisition of a new fact, is so much fortification against the advances of the enemy ; while all shallow half work, all pretence or show tend to create an appetite in the child's mind which shall demand such food.

The true teacher should always have in his mind these far-away and subtle effects of his teaching ; not present good or pleasure either for himself or his pupil, but the far-off good — the distant development. That idea would free him from the notion, too common in our day, that the success or failure of his efforts is to be tested by any adroitly contrived system of examinations ; or still worse, exhibitions. His success can alone be tested by the future lives of his pupils — by their love for, or dislike of, new knowledge. His success will be marked by their active growth through all their lives ; his failure, by their early arrested development.

to be little in common between the vigorous muscular movements, the clear perception, the logical reasoning of the day, and the lassitude, the wild visions, the strange vagaries of the night. All reasoning from analogy between the two states might, therefore, appear to be out of the question.

If, however, the phenomena of dreams are absolutely *sui generis*, we find ourselves in still greater perplexity. Instead of the direct testimony of consciousness, we must depend for our data upon the memory — a treacherous guide, even in our waking states, while its reports from the dream-world are often so vague and untrustworthy as to be wellnigh useless.

In full view of these difficulties, we must proceed with unusual care in our inductive processes, and draw sharply the line between the known and the conjectural.

For a large proportion of the embarrassments under which philosophy is constantly laboring, a careless use of language is responsible. It will therefore be to our advantage to discover what men commonly mean when they talk about sleep and dreams, and by careful investigation to determine how far these terms are used correctly and how far erroneously. Referring to Webster, we find sleep defined as "a natural and healthy, but temporary and periodical suspension of the functions of the organs of sense, as well as those of the voluntary and rational soul; that state of the animal in which the senses are more or less unaffected by external objects, and the fancy or fantasy only is active." Dreams, according to the same authority, are "the states or acts of the soul during sleep." The definition of dreams is doubtless true in a scientific, as well as a practical point of view. Whether or no, the definition of sleep is equally correct, future discussion will tend to show.

However dissimilar the two states of wakefulness and sleep may appear to be at first sight, there are some facts in general psychology which are suggestive and pertinent to our subject.

First. Psychology and physiology are closely linked. Mind and body act and react on each other. In its ordinary action, we know nothing of the soul save in connection with a material organism.

Second. In rare cases, such as the trance and mesmeric sleep, the mind seems to be freed, to a certain degree, from its bodily restraints, and to act according to independent laws of its own.

Third. It is generally true that greater energy is manifested by one faculty than by another. The quantum of intellectual activity at any given time is seldom equally distributed among all the mental

ing more or less than the judgment exercised in respect to questions of right and wrong, it is probable that the judgments of our sleep would be found to be regulated by the same principles as the judgments of our waking moments, provided we knew with equal certainty in both cases the data upon which we base those judgments.

Some time ago the writer had a most vivid dream, which illustrates several noteworthy points, but especially the fact that reasoning processes are carried on in dreams.

I dreamed that I was in the remotest corner of a deserted house, which stood alone, apart from all others, empty and desolate. The room where I stood was a small one, lighted by a single candle, which, however, was all-sufficient to disclose the bodies of the dead laid out on all sides of me. A shuddering horror took hold upon me, and I thought it was only by a strong effort of the will that I retained my self-control. Whether my greatest fear was of men or ghosts, I cannot say. I was in deadly terror of both. I was possessed with the idea that there were thieves lurking about the place. "But, after all," I reasoned, "there is little danger of that; for this is the best place of concealment in the whole house. If robbers were hiding on the premises, I should have found them here." No sooner had I rid myself of this idea than another suggested itself. The house was swarming with spectres and ghostly phantoms. At any moment they might come gliding in at the door. But again my reason came to my aid, and I argued: "If there are ghosts here, I shall not see them; for, even were they present, being ghosts and having no substance, they would present no surface from which the light could be reflected to my eye." Is it not manifest that I went through processes of reasoning, and sensible reasoning, too, in this dream, and also that I put forth a strong exertion of the will? Notice also two other points illustrated by this dream: —

First. That, in the process I went through to prove to myself that I should not see any spectres, my mind seemed to leap to its conclusion without thinking out the separate words, as I was obliged to do on awakening and trying to recall my dream; showing the rapidity with which the mind works in sleep, and also throwing light on the vexed question as to whether it is possible to think without words. This dream shows also very clearly an instinct of emotional harmony, which some writers believe to be prominent in dreams, and to form an important feature in producing the unity they often manifest.

Thus far in our analysis, we have been passing through a "debatable land" of antagonistic criticism. Now, however, that we are

was a mere recapitulation of information which Mr. R. had really received from his father during his lifetime, but which he had entirely forgotten until it was recalled by his dream. There is something startling in the power manifested by the memory in dreams, suggesting as it does, that forgetfulness is impossible, and that every thought and deed remains forever in remembrance, ready at some future day to bear its terrible witness for or against us.

From the investigation of dream psychology which we have now made, only one conclusion is possible, namely, that *sleep is a function of the body, and not of the soul*. What, then, it may be asked, is the difference between the state of the mind in sleep and its state in wakefulness? To which we would reply, there is no essential difference. But it will be very justly urged, if the mind is consciously active in sleep as well as in wakefulness, why is it not also conscious of the fact that it is dreaming? Why does it accept as reality the wild visions of sleep? For the very reason that sleep pertains to the body and not to the mind. To think, to feel, to will, are acts of the soul. Hence it recognizes them even in dreaming. To sleep is the part of the physical organs. With them it begins and ends. Nor is there any sign by which the mind is informed of the condition of the body.

Still the question arises, if wakefulness and sleep show no essential differences, why do we find the one characterized by all that is reasonable and possible, the other by all that is absurd and incongruous? This statement we have already called in question, in discovering that all the mental phenomena of our waking moments occur also in sleep. The falsity of such a distinction will appear still more clearly if we can show that the converse is equally true, namely, that all the mental phenomena of sleep occur during wakefulness. There are two kinds of error common in dreams, illusions and hallucinations. Lemoine defines an illusion as a wrong interpretation of a sensation made by an external object; an hallucination occurs, according to the same authority, when the mind assigns to an external object a sensation produced by an internal disturbance. Illusions are by no means confined to sleep, but are of frequent occurrence during wakefulness. Witness the following instance related by Dr. Luke, in his book entitled "Mind and Body:" "During the conflagration at the Crystal Palace, in the winter of 1866-7, when the animals were destroyed by fire, it was supposed that the chimpanzee had succeeded in escaping from his cage. Attracted to the roof, with this expectation in full force, men saw the unhappy animal

A continual reaction of organ on mind, and mind on organ is taking place." But to illustrate the point in question, as to whether hallucinations occur during wakefulness as well as sleep, the case of Goethe can be quoted, who could produce, at will, subjective copies of pictures and various works of art which he had seen. Shakespeare, in his own inimitable way, shows how the senses may be imposed upon. Macbeth, intent on the murder of Duncan, says of the dagger: —

— "I have thee not, and yet
I see thee still. Or art thou but
A dagger of the mind; a false creation?
Mine eyes are made the fools o' the other senses,
Or else worth all the rest.
I see thee still.
There's no such thing;
It is the bloody business, which informs thus to mine eyes."

Hallucinations are by no means confined to those pertaining to the sense of sight. It is a well-known fact that, after the amputation of a limb, the patient continually refers the pain he suffers to the amputated part. In some cases the sensation has been so strong that the diseased member has been actually dug up to see if something was not torturing it. From all of which it appears that error is not peculiar to sleep, any more than reasonableness is peculiar to our waking states.

We do not mean to deny that wildness and misrule are more common at night than during the day. But we maintain that this is for the very reason that the mind obeys the same laws in sleep as in wakefulness. Accustomed to accept as trustworthy the testimony of the senses, it continues to do so even in sleep; utterly unconscious and without warning of the somnolent condition of the bodily organism. Is it any wonder that it becomes confused, that it constantly mistakes the false for the true? So far as the vagaries of dreams are due to the mental rather than the physical condition, they are to be fully accounted for by the fact insisted on as a fundamental principle, and dwelt upon in different parts of this discussion, that voluntary attention is always lacking in dreams, and that frequently memory, and especially imagination, predominate over the other faculties. "Attention," says Maury, "instead of dominating the images which present themselves, is itself dominated by them." Under these circumstances, it is natural to suppose that the judgment and reason should be frequently in abeyance, since we have already seen that if

through such affections, duly qualified—and it may communicate its light to *reason* by analogies of science, and to *sense* by objective form or sensible symbol. Sense may confusedly perceive of itself, and reason may generalize partially, and discordantly cognize of itself; but only amplest wisdom can synthesize, or accordantly and fully cognize, and thence duly illumine both sense and reason *by conforming the whole truth to their scope of vision*.

Hence all that rational science can do, from its special fields of survey, is to criticise and protest as to falsities or perversions that arise under the *guise* of theology. It were as absurd to suppose that the specialist in science can discover and announce the truths of *universal science*—the science of theology—as to suppose that moonlight can illumine the sun. The lower can typify, illustrate, or analogically render the higher *when that lower is illumined by the higher*, and not before. *Then* it can only illustrate. It can never illumine the higher. How absurd, therefore, every pretence of rational science to determine as to the ruling truths of theology—as to Creative Being, Creative Operation, and Creative End—God's Being, generative activity in the realms of human experience, and destined fruition to such activity in Divine Order, supreme and constant in human affairs. This is the prerogative of theology alone. And a *scientific* theology will cover and explicate the whole truth of Divine Being, Operation, and End, as thus indicated.

The sole value of the criticisms of the rationalists as to matters of theology is that they tend to clear the ground of a mass of unseemly rubbish which has long been gathering there—men of straw, and other cumbersome forms—and thus open the way for the heat and light of *Central Sun* to fall on that ground and cause new and living forms to spring forth. Not only rationalistic science, but rationalistic philosophy has a mission in this direction. Neither are affirmative of real truth in highest realms, but both are serviceable as image-breakers. Iconoclastic thought goes naturally before integral thought, the partial and insufficient—mainly useful to tear down—before the universal and efficient, competent to affirm and build up.

Philosophic idealism tries to affirm the ripened fruit of human thought; but fruition can only counterpoise initial seed, or first fruit given. When that given seed or first term is only “negation” “abstraction,” or “idea,” that vanishes into nothingness, thus giving no hold for human heart, head, or feet; only “negation” can come of it as fruition. So much is clear. *Nothing* comes of *nothing*.

To Christian science—a scientific theology, as knowledge derived

multiple of parts in the object, in so far as that succession is subjected to a rule." This passage, easily found (127) like the subsequent ones, is Kant's own express definition of the schema in regard. We see that, so far as time is concerned, this schema is a succession; but no influence of time goes further than that. All else concerns a *realè*; and a fixed rule of the parts of that *realè*—a rule which is in time, but not prescribed by time. The very succession referred to is not that of time, but of the parts of the sensuous impression. The schema in question, Kant says, again (128), "is the relation of the sensuous perceptions, the one to the other, in all time (that is, according to a rule of time-determination)." That evidently is to the same effect. Time is spoken of, but it is only the vehicle or medium *in* which; there is no hint whatever of time determining a rule: on the contrary, it is the rule determines time. "The universal proposition of the analogies of experience (152) is: all sense-presentations stand, as regards their existence, *a priori* under rules of the determination of their relation, the one to the other, in one time." And here we see that Kant by "all time" and "one time" means quite the same thing—accordance with a "rule of time-determination;" but there is no thought in either phrase of an all or whole of a "one all-embracing time." The rule here, in effect, is a rule of relative existence *in one and the same time*; and one can at once realize the meaning by referring to either of the special categories implied. In causality the rule is of the existence of a B necessarily due to the existence of an A in a time common to both; while in reciprocity, again, the rule is of an A B, in which there is a relation of transition at once from A to B and from B to A in the same time. Once more the question is only of things, though necessarily disposed in the extension of time. Were that extension alone considered, the succession implied would be an indifferent one, and only in one direction; whereas the objective succession under view is not indifferent, and may be in two directions. "Properly the schema is only the phenomenon or the sensible notion of an object in agreement with the category." Evidently, then, that schema or sensible *effigies* must, as concerns relation, refer to *connections of things*, that is, to a certain forecast of rules affecting objects in time; but not themselves (the rules) from time. I have already argued the point that in the

is worthy of consideration,' he said. 'Michael Angelo knows that the gentleman from Spain is an artist, and will hardly agree to speak about his art. I believe it would be best for the gentleman to hide himself somewhere so that he could listen.'

"'It would perhaps be harder than you think to hide the "gentleman from Spain" away from Michael Angelo's sight,' I answered the reverend man, a little bitterly. 'For, even were I hidden, he would still perceive my presence even better than you through your glasses can see me standing here. Only wait until he comes, and see if I have not spoken truly.'

"The Marchioness and Lattantio laughed, but for my part I did not join, nor did Ambrosio, who might have learned from this that he would find in me more than a mere painter.

"After a few moments of silence there was a knock at the door. Every one feared that it was some one else than the Master, who lived quite under Monte Cavallo. Luckily, however, the servant of the Marchioness met him close by San Silvestro. Michael Angelo was going to the springs, and came through the Esquiline street, talking with his color-grinder, Urbino. So he fell right into the trap, and it was he who knocked at the door.

"The Marchioness rose to receive him. She remained standing for awhile, then she begged him to be seated between herself and Messer Lattantio. Then she began to speak. Unconsciously she added dignity to those whom she addressed and to the place where she was. With an art that cannot be described nor imitated she spoke of one thing after another. She did it with as much earnestness as grace. She merely touched upon painting, so that afterwards she could draw the great artist more securely. She managed like a general who does not try to storm the fortress, but attempts to take it by surprise. But Michael Angelo saw the ruse, and guarded his walls by well-posted sentinels. He knew how to neutralize her attacks by every kind of counter-action, but at last she conquered, and truly, I do not know who could have held out any longer.

"'It is a known fact,' she said, 'that one is always wholly conquered if one dares to attack Michael Angelo in his own kingdom—that of finesse. And you see, Messer Lattantio, there is only one way of conquering and silencing him—one must speak of law-suits or of painting.'

With horror he discovers that it is only a skeleton bark. No kindly, helpful hands are extended from its side to aid him; the only companion of Unbelief is Death—here and hereafter. The game has been played; Unbelief has won the will of man; Death claims his other faculties, and darkness and fear envelope him. To doubt the All is to doubt himself, and this, the worst of unbeliefs, now fastens upon him. "One after one, by the star-dogged moon," every aspiration and noble desire, every power and every purpose, "with heavy thump, a lifeless lump," drops down and perishes, only turning ere they die to curse his negligence to use, or worse, his abuse of them.

"Alone, alone, all, all alone, alone on a wide, wide sea!" The suffering soul of man in the wide expanse, in the crowded immensity of the world, is isolated by its agony in that Gethsemane where the best beloved are left behind, and the bare spirit goes up alone to meet and wrestle with its Maker. And oh! the horror, the shrinking, the bloody sweat of it all! The grace and beauty of life have departed, and only a sickening sense of guilt and wretchedness, of bitter self-loathing and self-disgust remains: "A thousand, thousand slimy things lived on; and so did I."

"I looked upon the rotting sea"—the world which is his shadow, upon which he has projected his Me—"and drew my eyes away!" "I looked upon the rotting deck"—his own inner consciousness—"and there the dead men lay." "I looked to Heaven," but his unbelief has closed that to his prayer. "I closed my lids and kept them closed," but he cannot shut out the view, "for the sky and the sea, the sea and the sky"—doubt of all around and of all above him—"lay like a load on my weary eye, and the dead"—doubt in himself—"were at my feet!" The talent which the lord of the country gave to his laborer to keep for him has been returned, and he hears the well-earned sentence: "Take, therefore, the talent from him, and cast the unprofitable servant into outer darkness." The lowest deep is reached. On this plane there is no more to suffer or to know. Hell is sounded.

This is the culmination of the poem; no higher point, no greater misery is possible. It has been gradually, but powerfully and tempestuously, working up to its climax, and now the change is marked, truly and unmistakably, by the altered movement. Hitherto the transitions have all been sudden, the epithets harsh, and the tone hard and rebellious. The stars have "rushed out;" the breeze "dropt down;" "at one stride" came the dark. We have had

especially, it depends upon the harmony which exists between the latter and the products of the earth.

The celestial body resembles the idea, whose copy it is, in this, that the former like the latter is productive and brings forth all forms of the universe out of itself. Matter, although as phenomenon it is the body of the universe, again differentiates itself into soul and body. The body of matter consists of isolated particular things in which the unity is wholly lost in multiplicity and extension, and which therefore appear as inorganic.

The pure historical presentation of inorganic forms has been made a special branch of knowledge, instinctively avoiding any appeal to internal, qualitative determinations. When the specific differences of matter itself have once been comprehended quantitatively, and there is the possibility of presenting it by means of mere changes of form as a metamorphosis of one and the same substance, then the way is opened to an historical construction of the system of bodies, a decided beginning having already been made through Steffens's ideas.

Geology, which should have the same idea in reference to the whole earth, should not exclude any of its products, and should demonstrate the genesis of everything in historical continuity and predetermined change. Since the real side of science must always be historical (because outside of science there is nothing which rests originally and only on truth, except history), so geology in the completeness of the highest development, as history of nature itself, for which the earth is only the middle and starting point, would be the true integration and pure objective presentation of the science of nature, to which experimental physics forms but the transition and the means.

As physical things are the body of matter, so the soul which is reflected in it is the light. Through its relation to the difference, and as immediate idea of the same, the ideal itself becomes finite and appears subordinately in extension as an ideal, which describes space but does not fill it. Hence, in the phenomenon itself it is the ideal, but not the whole ideal of the act of subject become object (since it leaves the one phase outside itself in the corporeal), it is the mere relative ideal.

The knowledge of light is like the knowledge of matter, is indeed one with it, since both exist only in contrast one with the other (can be truly comprehended as the subjective and objective side). Since this spirit of nature has gone away from physics, its life in all its members is extinguished, for there is no possible transition from universal to organic nature. The Newtonian theory of optics is the

physics, it belongs to applied mathematics ; but the universal type of its forms, expressed as purely objective, is prescribed by physics ; they are as it were the dead forms of the dynamic process.

The province of the latter physics in its ordinary separation is limited to the sphere of the general antithesis between light and matter or gravity. The absolute science of Nature comprehends in one and the same whole as well these phenomena of separated unities as those of the higher organic world, through whose products the entire subject-objectivation manifests itself in its two sides at one and the same time.

A NEW WORK ON KANT.

Professor John Watson, of Queen's University, Kingston, Canada, has a new book in press, entitled, "Kant and his English Critics," which will appear, it is expected, about the first of next year from the press of M. Macehose, of Glasgow. The book will defend the Critical Philosophy against Empirical Psychology, and will contain a criticism of the latter in its main features, showing, however, that Kant's theory must be freed from certain unwarrantable assumptions which destroy its unity. Our readers are fully familiar with the vigorous thought of Professor Watson, and will welcome a treatise from him on a theme so important.

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CRITICISM OF KANT'S MAIN PRINCIPLES.¹

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If we suppose it to result (from the foregoing¹) that Kant's schemata, as simply so many self-deceptions, must be held to vanish, we may suppose, also, that Kant himself—seeing that, for reception of the contributions of special sense, there can now no longer be question of any *a priori* system of forms, half-sensuous and half-intellectual—would admit his whole transcendental enterprise to have failed. In view of Kant's own perfect honesty, we may really allow ourselves to suppose this. It does not follow, however, that others (Sir W. Hamilton, for instance), who opine Kant's causality to be just a separate and peculiar mental principle, would be disposed to sympathize with as much. They know nothing of the schematism; for them the categories alone exist; and they have no thought but to place these in direct contact with sense. We may safely assume their possible contention to be insufficient, however, and Kant's conjectural admission to be alone tenable.

My second main objection, now, to the Kantian theory of perception concerns the empirical facts which, *through* the schema,

¹ The reference is to the preceding portion of this article published in the July (1880) number of this Journal.—[Ed.

again is a form, or spectrum, or potential disc, attached from the first to my faculty of *external* sense. I can only have sensations within, and the time and space into which they are received are necessarily also within, are but original appendices of my own faculties within. But, further now, a *third* consideration is that the empirical breadth—the multiple constituted by my received impressions of sense—is a *variety*: all impressions and all groups of impressions are not alike. All grouping or connecting of impressions in apprehension is, however, always *in the first instance* subjective merely.¹ It is, in the *fourth* place, only in consequence of the multiple in the subjective cognition being subsumed under a category that it becomes objectively valid; that is, an object in actual experience. Kant goes on to explain “that all our judgments (cognitions) are first of all mere judgments (cognitions) of sensible perception, and that, so far, they concern only ourselves, only each one’s individual subject: it is only afterwards that we give them a new nexus (in the judgment or cognition of experience), the nexus to an object, namely, in that we will them to be valid, not only occasionally, and not only for us, but always, and for everybody.” What causes the impressions in us is utterly unknown, and never asked for by us: what is an object to us is the blur of special sense received into, and further manipulated by, our own internal *a priori* conditions of a possible experience, which conditions are sensuous for the reception, and intellectual for the further manipulation.

Kant now proceeds to some illustrations. That the room is warm, sugar sweet, wormwood bitter, these he calls judgments only subjectively valid. And he admits that, referring to formed objects (room, sugar, wormwood), they are not good examples of his own first mere subjective impressions that are there *in preparation for* objects, even such objects as room, sugar, and wormwood themselves; but he uses them only to make intelligible what he means by a subjective validity. Such mere feelings (bitterness, sweetness, etc.), are not only subjective at first—they

¹ In his letter to Tieffrunk (XI., 184), Kant denies that combination can, as such, be *perceived*, unless preceded by a category; but, on his own showing, the sun rising, a stone warms, which is itself a combination, and a combination whose “Wahrnehmenseyn” or “Angenommenseyn” must, even in his eyes, necessarily precede action of the very category!

there not absence of every cue, clew, hint, motive, or reason, for the category to stir? Is it not that conviction that, so to speak, draws string and brings the category, the epigenesis, down? But, once having that conviction, can you honestly say that more, that the category, that the epigenesis, is required?

To my mind, Kant must have been long uneasy under such or similar self-questionings, and could only comfort or reassure himself by glancing again at that "whole of pure reason," and the need that lay for it in a matter of cognition that was only (his mistake) internal affection. That last consideration we must allow to have remained with him always, without a shadow of misgiving; and, allowing him that, we must allow him also sufficient justification for standing by his colors to the last. Had it not remained with him, it is just possible, so honest was he, that he would have renounced his epigenesis; as, surely, it is credible to everybody that, had he never entertained the one, he would never have thought of the other. Facts of sense are, as mere facts of sense, under every supposition, contingent; but, the moment they are allowed to concern an absolute independent world without, it is understood also how they may bring with them their own principles of nexus. When the dissolving sugar disappears in the water-glass, what is perceived, so far as sensation is concerned (on the retina of the eye), is only a white disappearing in a gray. Nevertheless, when objectively perceived, what is before me is a case of causality, and consequently of necessity. But it is not I—it is not any machinery of mine that has made, of a mere change of color, all these objective connections. There was no order in the colors that acted as a string to bring down upon them an epigenesis—a whole fixed system of arrangement from within me. Any arrangement that comes to be discovered belongs to the things themselves, of which the colors on my retina are mere signs. Any necessity, too, is theirs, and not mine. The necessity that is present, in fact, can, in many cases, be put into pound weights and absolute figures. The culvert that yields to a torrent is equal to so many hundred-weights, but the torrent is equal to so many more, and hence the yielding—the stoop of the balance. Imagination is imagination, of course, and must be allowed to say sugar and water, stones and mortar, etc., *may* change; but, despite imagination, the nature of things is once for all so. They

and objectivity as due to the category. On page 87 we learn that the notion of causality can never be inductively acquired, for what is usual can never amount to what is necessary, and the notion itself implies the necessity of an absolutely universal rule: "the effect does not merely attach itself to the cause, but it is occasioned by it and follows from it;" the cause (p. 185) is "something so constituted, that when it is, something else always and infallibly ensues on it." Such expressions contrast rather with the "usual" of the note just seen.

But, as might only be expected, it is in the *Prolegomena*, and not in the *Kritik*, that we are to find positive evidence of Kant vacillating as in presence of a difficulty which he is at length aware of. The two judgments (as commented on before) come at once in proof here. In that work he explains (p. 65) that the "logical conjunction," to which he refers as preceding the category, and as taking place in the sense-materials alone, is the process of comparison by which a character of generality, even so far, is added; the category only follows. Page 75, he says: "It is possible that there should be found in perception a rule of relation which prescribes that on a certain presentation of sense another (but not *vice versa*) should always follow." The necessity or universality, then, attributed to the facts, even in anticipation of the category, is in the above passages conspicuous. And we have just seen how Kant elsewhere seems to regard that necessary universal as no more than a "usual!" That is what the note on page 62 intimates of the subjective judgment in the case of the stone and the sun: "It is a mere judgment of perception, and contains no necessity, let me have ever so often experienced it, and let others have ever so often experienced it; the perceptions find themselves only *usually* so connected." When we compare these utterances, the vacillation they imply must be quite unmistakable; a nexus which was constant and infallible, etc., is now only "usual." But we have only to point to Kant's own reasoning (II., 87, and 728) to learn that what was only *usual* could be no cue or clew or hint to a necessity that was *apodictic*. The notion of a cause, he says, "absolutely demands that something A should be of such a nature that another something B follows out of it *necessarily and according to an absolutely universal rule*. It is quite evident, indeed, that whatever, *on these grounds*, Kant

announce that space and time are realities, without feeling himself called upon to explain at the same time what relation they bear to intelligence. Ordinary realism, and its offspring, psychological idealism, have received their death-blow at Kant's hands, and no attempt to resuscitate them can be of any avail. Kant himself, at least, was firmly convinced that, in maintaining space and time to be forms of our intelligence on its perceptive side, he was initiating a reform of supreme importance in philosophy. Dr. Stirling speaks of Kant's doctrine of the external world exactly as if it were identical with the sensationalism of such thinkers as Mr. Huxley and Mr. Spencer. But it is surely one thing to say that space and time are given to us in feelings set up in us by an object lying beyond consciousness, and another thing to say that they belong to the very constitution of our intelligence in so far as it is perceptive. If space and time are forms of perception, we can no longer go on asking how a world of objects lying beyond the mind gets, in some mysterious way, into the mind. Kant never, in his philosophical theory, makes any attempt to prove the special facts of our ordinary knowledge, or the special laws of the natural sciences; these he simply assumes as data which it is no business of his to establish. But, although he leaves the concrete world just as it was before, he does not leave the philosophical theory commonly put forward to explain it just as it was. From the critical point of view, things can no longer be regarded as unintelligible abstractions, as they must be in any theory which, by extruding them from the inner circle of knowledge, virtually makes them unknowable; being brought into relation with our intelligence, there is no barrier to their being known and comprehended. I cannot see that it is doing Kant justice simply to say that space and time, and the objects filling them, which before were without the mind, are by him brought within the mind. He certainly holds them to be "within," but they are within, not as transient feelings, but as permanent and unchangeable constituents of knowledge, belonging to the very nature of *human* intelligence. Omit the "human," and we have a view of the external world which is consistent with its reality in the only intelligible meaning of the term, and which yet denies space and time to be subjective any more than objective. Kant here, as always, is greater than he was himself aware of, and that seems to

judgment, since it merely excludes from the conception of body an attribute contradictory of it. We can thus see wherein the essential vice of the dogmatic theory of judgment consists. The dogmatist supposes we may establish the objective application of a conception by simply showing that a given judgment is not self-contradictory. Wolff, *e. g.*, thought he could prove the conception of causality to be true of real things, because that conception, when analyzed, yields the judgment, "Whatever is contingent has a cause." But the judgment is purely analytical, only expressing explicitly what is implicit in the conception of the "contingent." How, then, are we to account for the application of conceptions to real things? How, in other words, can we show that there are judgments which are synthetical, and yet rest upon conceptions? This question, insoluble on the dogmatic method, may be answered by the critical method.

We have seen that sense can only contribute the particular element in knowledge, and that the universal element is supplied by thought. A conception, therefore, on which a synthetical judgment is to rest can be nothing but a pure universal, having in it no concrete element. In all thinking which yields real knowledge the particulars of sense must be reduced to unity by being referred to a single supreme self, for, on any other supposition, there would be no unity in our knowledge as a whole. It is nothing to the point that we may not, in our ordinary consciousness, be aware that the self is the supreme condition of any real knowledge. It is enough if we can show that in all knowledge of reality the "I" must be present, and must manifest its presence in the actual fact of knowledge. Certainly, if we take the self apart from its activity, as manifested in knowing, we cannot get beyond the merely analytical judgment, $I=I$; but, when we seek to explain actual knowledge, we are compelled to see that, were there no identical "I," expressing its activity in uniting the particulars of sense, we could have no connected knowledge. The "I think," or "I unite," is, however, but the general expression of the condition of any real knowledge. But, as all knowing is definite knowing, or the thinking of the real world in specific ways, to intelligence as thinking there must belong universal forms or functions of unity, enabling us to reduce the manifold of sense to definite unity, order, and system. How do we know that to

to-day his primeval commission—to *subdue* the earth and have *dominion* over it.

Man is not a material being, nor yet a physical being. Physics and matter are his subordinates, his means, and instruments in time. But from these he subsists not at all. He is a plant of celestial genus :

“ Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting ;
The soul that rises with us, our life star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar.

“ Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory, do we come
From God, which is our home.

“ Heaven lies about us in our infancy,
Shades of the prison-house begin to close upon the growing boy,
But he beholds the light and whence it flows,
He sees it in his joy.

“ The youth who daily farther from the east
Must travel, still is nature's priest,
And by the vision splendid
Is on his way attended.

“ At length the man perceives it die away,
And fade into the light of common day.”

Man is an entity of the supernatural order. No physical forces or material forms can ever become component of mind, or of mental processes. These natures are diverse, and not related in continuous degree. And the lower nature cannot become the higher nature, nor intrude itself into its sphere. Universally, matter is the not-me—the otherness to mind.

Man appropriates the material elements, forces, and forms to the subsistence of his corporeal nature—like to like—and so must nurture himself with the knowledges of truth and the participations of good divine. In nature he finds provision for his gymnastics; in the heavens, provision for his subsistence. And of man there *is* a physical body, and there is a spiritual body, and the spiritual body is the true human body, and the natural corporeality is its

history. And it never is nor was the inane drivel and childish babble of a puerile age. But mystic habiliment is the native investiture of mystic subject—of true entity. And a true mythology—a science of myth—will discover in this mythic *incarnate mediatorship*, of all the generations of earth, the very connective link, the very pneumogastric nerve, between the supernatural and the natural orders, without which the natural order has no possible subsistence.

Said Kreeshna to a very ancient discipleship: "I am the Lord of all created beings, having command over my own nature. I am made evident by my own power; and as often as there is a decline of virtue, and an insurrection of vice and injustice in the world, I make myself evident; and thus I appear from age to age for the destruction of wickedness, for the preservation of justice, and for the establishment of virtue."

In Egypt, one day, *Osiris* was born, and a voice came into the world with him, saying, "The Lord of all things is now born." And the Temple of Ammon reëchoed with a loud voice, "Osiris, the great and good king, is now born." And he drew mankind by laws, and arts, and worship, from a beggarly and beastly life. He was the manifestation of divine love and wisdom unto men; he was betrayed and put to death by the malice of the evil one; he was buried and rose again; he went into the world of the good dæmons, whence he was the helper of his discipleship on earth, and was the judge of the dead. He finally ascended back to the sphere of the gods from which he came out.

One day, in the Friendly Isle, Apollo was born. Earth smiled, and the goddesses shouted aloud for joy. His food was the nectar and ambrosia of the gods. He announced his mission to be, "To declare to men the will of Jove." He walked upon the ground, and it became covered with golden flowers; he was the god of the arts of use and beauty; he was the power of healing, and so vanquished the great earth-serpent—bestial sense in the souls of men. He built the temple again among men, and as a blazing star descended into it, and abode in it. He was exalted unto the heavens. Thence he was the oracle and the prophet, and he was the shepherd and the physician, and he was the lawgiver and the king of men, and

"To him all Nature's tribes their difference owe,
 And changing seasons from his music flow;
 Since to his care the figured seal's consigned,
 Which stamps the world with forms of every kind."

And, says Plato: "There remaineth to him—the Delphian Apollo—the greatest, noblest, and most important social institutions—the erection of temples, sacrifices, and other services of the gods, and likewise the rites of the dead. Such things as these, indeed, we neither know ourselves, nor, in founding the State, would we intrust them to any other, if we be wise; nor would we employ any other interpreter than that of the country, for surely this god, being the natural interpreter to all men about such matters, he interprets to them sitting in the middle, and, as it were, navel of the earth;" the divine mediator to that generation between God and man.

One time Odin came down out of Asagard—the home and city of the gods. He vanquished the enmity of earth; he led mankind from barbaric unto rural and civic arts, and to conquest in the battle of life; he established in the mind of man two kingdoms—manheim and godheim—the principles and powers of the kingdoms of nature and of the supernatural. He ascended into godheim, whence he often manifested himself to his friends, whom he inspired and led to victory in their earthly conflicts and struggles. He finally disappeared from godheim and went back to Asagard, from which he came out.

One day, not long ago, a child was born in Bethlehem of Judea, and they called his name Emmanuel, which being interpreted is, "*God with us.*" And behold! there came wise men from the East, saying, "Where is he that is born king of the Jews, for we have seen his star in the East, and have come to worship him?" And when they saw the star, that it stood over the child, they rejoiced with exceeding great joy. He announced that he came down from heaven to declare the counsels, and to do the will of his Father, that he might enlighten and raise up the race of mortal mould. He organized a terrestrial order of apostles and disciples. "He was crucified, dead, and buried; he descended into Hades; the third day he rose from the dead; he ascended into heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of God, the Father Almighty. From thence he judgeth the living and the dead." And

he leadeth and helpeth this generation unto all victory and achievement.

And so in Kreesna, and Zoroaster, and Osiris, and Apollo, and Odin, and Jesus Christ, was the *Logos* that illuminates the world and lighteth every man that cometh into the world. And so the annals of all the generations—from China and India, through Persia, and Chaldea, and Egypt, and Greece, and Scandinavia, and Christendom—their religions, their sciences, their arts, their philosophy, their architecture, their poesy, their music, their painting, their sculpture—all of every age—establish their hyparxis in the mythic fountains, in the incarnations and oracles of the dispensation.

Says Mr. Emerson: " 'Tis certain that worship stands in some commanding relation to the health of man, and to his highest powers, so as to be in some manner the source of intellect. All the great ages have been ages of belief—I mean when there was any extraordinary power of performance, when great national movements began, when arts appeared, when heroes existed, when poems were made, the human soul was in earnest, and had fixed its thoughts on *spiritual verities*, with as strict a grasp as that of the hands on the sword, or the pencil, or the trowel."

In Scripture dialect, Jesus was the son of a carpenter—he was the young mechanic. This foretokens and portends a mechanical generation; mind in the science and use of the mechanical powers. I met one day a college friend who had resided in India a quarter of a century. We were recounting together the marvellous achievements in Christian mechanics during that period. As an instance I related the event of the then past year; how that, when the great continental belt, the Pacific Railroad, was consummated in the interior of the continent, the strokes of the hammer that drove the last nail were heard in the great cities of the two seaboard! "Yes," said he, "and we heard it in Bombay." And no greater miracle did any historic faith of the world ever work by the hand of man. And in the late World's Exposition it is noteworthy that the unprecedented and unparalleled mechanical invention and construction characterized exclusively the Christian nations. Let us briefly advert to the fountain, and see what we can see.

One day, when he was come nigh to Jerusalem, Jesus sent two of his disciples to a place where they should find an ass tied,

the permanent in the variable and evanescent. Both abjure the accidents and specialities of life, or, so far as they come in contact with them, employ them not so much for their own sakes as in the way of incarnations, symbols, or illustrative examples of what is neither special nor accidental.

These considerations may suffice by way of reply to a not impossible question of the reader's on seeing the heading of this essay: "What have Poetry and Philosophy to do with one another?" Dismissing, however, for the present the general question of the close kinship and constant interaction existing between these two great forms of intellectual movement, we have, as to the present subject of inquiry, independent evidence that Shelley's mental habits and tastes led him originally in the direction of metaphysical study quite as much as in that of poetry. As to the question of fact, it will be sufficient to quote the following distinct statement of Mrs. Shelley, who says (in the preface to vol. I. of the "Essays, Letters from Abroad, Prose Fragments, etc."), alluding to the detached thoughts on metaphysical questions contained in that collection:—

"The fragments of metaphysics will be highly prized by a metaphysician. Such a one is aware how difficult it is to strip bare the internal nature of man, to divest it of prejudice, of the mistakes engendered by familiarity, and by language, which has become one with certain ideas, and those very ideas erroneous." (The above remark, by the way, illustrates our position that the poet and the philosopher are, at least, supplementary the one to the other. The latter gives us the eternal properties of thought disengaged from adventitious accretions; the former holds up to our view the embodied energies of pure passion disenthralled from qualification by triviality and custom.) "Had not Shelley deserted metaphysics for poetry in his youth, and had he not been lost to us early, so that all his vaster projects were wrecked with him in the waves, he would have presented the world with a complete theory of mind; a theory to which Berkeley, Coleridge, and Kant¹ would have contributed;

¹ Is there any evidence of Shelley's having studied Kant in the original, or of his having become seriously acquainted with his doctrines through Coleridge? The above words almost seem to imply, but do not necessarily imply, that he had done one or the other. He first refers to Kant in "Peter Bell the Third:" "The Devil then sent to Leipsic fair, For Born's translation of Kant's book; A world of words, tall foremost, Where" . . . etc. There are no traces, however, of a Kantian influence in his poetical writings. Indeed, it is antecedently improbable, as I shall endeavor to point out that a mind constituted as Shelley's was, could have had any sympathy with the dualistic attitude of Kant.

The future and the past are idle shadows
Of thought's eternal flight—they have no being ;
Naught is but that it feels itself to be.

Mahmud. What meanest thou? thy words stream like a tempest
Of dazzling mist within my brain—they shake
The earth on which I stand, and hang like night
On heaven above me. What can they avail?
They cast on all things, surest, brightest, best,
Doubt, insecurity, astonishment.

Ahasuerus. Mistake me not! All is contained in each.
Dodona's forest to an acorn's cup
Is that which has been, or will be, to that
Which is—the absent to the present. Thought
Alone, and its quick elements, Will, Passion,
Reason, Imagination, cannot die ;
They are what that which they regard appears,
The stuff whence mutability can weave
All that it hath dominion o'er—worlds, worms,
Empires, and superstitions. What has thought
To do with time, or place, or circumstance?

In this splendid rhapsody, this hymnic glorification of the might and majesty of creative thought, we have Shelley's quasi-formal exposition of the poetic side of the philosophy which claimed his allegiance, namely, idealism ; we have the reasoned tenets of Berkeley, clothed, not in syllogisms, but in language "transmuted by the secret alchemy" of inspiration to such "potable gold" as flows fresh from the inmost depths of Plato's eagle spirit—such words as burn with ruder glare and less restrained vigor in Neo-Platonic mysticism—such figures as gleam for us once more out of darkness in that desperate struggle of abstract thought to find an opening for itself from out of the cavern of common speech in which it is enchained, and to turn the "idola" of its prison into its vehicles and instruments, which characterizes the efforts of a Fichte, a Hegel, or a Coleridge. The *indirect* influence of Shelley's metaphysics on the general tone of his productions will be considered below ; meanwhile, for their direct manifestation and exposition, could we desire anything finer ?

¹ Shelley constantly insists on the eternity of Thought in his poetry: *cp.* in the same drama :—

"Based on the crystalline sea
Of thought and its eternity."

(Vol. II., p. 153, of Mrs. Shelley's edition.)

which, in Mrs. Shelley's words,¹ it "gave to his ideas," and "the wide field for his imagination," are results ascribed to it in quite as emphatic language by the poet himself (in a passage already quoted—"Essays, Letters, etc.," vol. I., p. 242). Mrs. Shelley again, in her note on the "Prometheus Unbound," writes:—

"It requires a mind as subtle and penetrating as his own to understand the mystic meanings scattered throughout the poem. They elude the ordinary reader by their abstraction and delicacy of distinction; but they are far from vague. It was his design to write prose metaphysical essays on the nature of man, *which would have served to explain much of what is obscure in his poetry*; a few scattered fragments of observations and remarks alone remain. *He considered these philosophical views of mind and nature to be instinct with the intensest spirit of poetry.*"

Indeed, the kind of stamp which Intellectualism would leave on the writings of a man of Shelley's nature would not be difficult to surmise from *a priori* considerations. A system of immaterial philosophy gives less importance to the external, as such, than to the internal, to the phenomenal than to the spiritual, to the objective than to the subjective. In matter it sees nothing but the vesture and outward efflorescence of some product of mind; while in every affection of mind—in the waking vision, the vivid dream, the apparently lawless flight of fancy—it sees a supreme reality. In a concrete object it sees only the shrine of an abstract idea; in an abstract idea, on the other hand, it sees the only true existence and the only true divinity. It idealizes and humanizes the material; and the ideal it personifies and clothes with the definite outlines of individuality. To the adherent of such views as these the work of poetry would appear only as a richer and higher exercise of the same faculty which, from the strictly metaphysical side of Idealism, is occupied, as has been said, in "substantializing relations and bringing substances into relation."

Now, this twofold use of imagination is just that for which Shelley is most conspicuous. Every poem that he wrote during his best period illustrates one or both of these two modes in which creative

¹ Passage quoted above from the preface to the "Essays, Letters from Abroad, etc." The question has been sometimes raised as to Mrs. Shelley's capability of appreciating her husband's powers. I may take this opportunity of remarking that it certainly seems to me that, notwithstanding all that has been written on Shelley since, no better account of the salient features in his genius is to be found than in the prefaces and notes written by her to his different works.

and primarily, "the Divine Ideal which underlies all appearance" (Fichte), and Shelley could not have been unmoved by such influences. (At the beginning of his last and best period, 1815-1822, he wrote his lament over Wordsworth, beginning "Poet of Nature," etc.; "O there are spirits in the air," was addressed in thought to Coleridge¹ at about the same time.)

As to his personal characteristics, every one has heard of his abnormally acute sensibility and impulsive temperament. In the different lives of him which have been written, we are constantly having stories of his vivid dreams, which he could not persuade himself *were* dreams, and which often drove him from his room with cries of horror;² nay, more, of his waking visions, of the reality of which he used to be equally convinced. This nervous intensity of imagination, giving all the force of positive existence to every long-pondered creation of his mind, to every

"incommunicable dream
And twilight phantasm, and deep noonday thought,"

must have worked with his philosophy to produce the kind of poetry it did. Bearing in mind these passionate susceptibilities of his—moral as well as intellectual—we can, moreover, explain, without having much recourse to his metaphysical doctrines, the passionate and generous spirit which would at one time "sadly blame the jarring and inexplicable frame of this wrong world," and at another would declaim with fiery vigor against "the harsh and grating cry of tyrants and of foes,"³ which was ever dissatisfied with the seemingly immobile and unplastic facts of his social environment, and which yet always believed against experience, and hoped against hope, that Man—even "cruel, cold, formal Man"—could and would, by willing it, emancipate himself from inveterate prejudice and self-

¹ Cp. the fine description of Coleridge in Shelley's "Letter to Maria Gisborne" (vol. III., p. 53, in Mrs. Shelley's ed.).

² In the vividness of his dreams, Shelley reminds us of Coleridge, De Quincey, and Blake. In "Essays, Letters, etc.," vol. I., pp. 248-'51, he gives some account of the phenomena of dreams, and is beginning to recount one which occurred in his own experience, when, as he afterward wrote, he was obliged to leave off through being overcome "by thrilling horror."

³ Was Wordsworth, a poet more at ease with circumstances and his fellows, thinking of these words when he spoke of his "hearing oftentimes the still, sad music of humanity, *not harsh nor grating*, though of ample power to chasten or subdue?" At any rate, in these two passages, the different characters of the two poets are well expressed.

ishness, from "old custom" and "legal crime," and stand forth once more in purified rejuvenescence.¹ His energies were always devoted to stamping, as far as he could, the things and circumstances around him with the impress of an ideal—an ideal which, since it was very truth and reality to him, he wished to see externalized, and thus become equally so to others. The untiring zeal in endeavoring to imprint such ideals on the face of the actual conditions of existence, which we see reflected in such poems as the "Hellas" and the "Prometheus," the "passion for reforming the world,"² which he so fearlessly avowed; these, no doubt, came from his moral character; but in the construction of "the beautiful idealisms of moral excellence," with which, as he says, it was his "purpose to familiarize the more select classes of poetical readers," it is not perhaps extravagant to attribute something to the working upon his imagination of the speculative principles of Idealism.

Thus both intellectual and social environment, and personal tendencies of sentiment and character, largely assisted the philosophy of Shelley in determining the cast of his poetry; but we must not any the more lose sight of this last factor as a distinctly important one, especially when we remember that Shelley was within an ace of becoming a metaphysician pure and simple;³ that, even as it was, he was throughout his life "philosophy's accepted guest," and that he himself regarded metaphysical studies as an element in the train-

¹ Shelley's tone, though pessimistic at times (*e. g.*, in both the two beautiful pieces on "Mutability"), is in general distinctly optimistic as to the possible future of the human race. See the concluding choruses of the "Prometheus Unbound," and, above all, the soft, halcyon verses of prophecy and hope which conclude the "Hellas," and lull to rest the fierce discords of the opening of the drama.

² Shelley's preface to the "Prometheus Unbound." He somewhat bitterly alludes to the many disappointments which await the earnest reformer, in the lines at the close of the third part of "Peter Bell the Third": "And some few, like we know who, damned—but God alone knows why—to believe their minds are given to make this ugly hell a heaven; in which faith they live and die." The second part of Shelley's "Defence of Poetry," which unfortunately he did not write, was to have contained "a defence of the attempt to idealize the modern forms of manners and opinions, and compel them into a subordination to the imaginative and creative faculty." Here we see a meeting point of his moral character with his idealism.

³ According to Mrs. Shelley (editor's note on "The Revolt of Islam"), "Shelley possessed two remarkable qualities of intellect—a brilliant imagination, and a logical exactness of reason. His inclinations led him (he fancied) almost alike to poetry and metaphysical discussions, . . . he said that he deliberated at one time whether he should so devote himself to poetry or metaphysics." Cf. also editor's note on the "Cenci" (ii., 116).